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I. INTRODUCTION
The Kingdom of Belgium is a country in northwest Europe. It is a
founding member of the European Union and hosts its headquarters,1 as well
as those of other major international organizations, including the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 Belgium covers an area of 11,787
square miles (30,528 square kilometers) and has a population of about 10.6
million people.3 Straddling the cultural boundary between Germanic and
Latin Europe, Belgium is home to two main linguistic groups: the Dutchspeaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons. In addition, Belgium is
home to a small group of German speakers.4 Belgium’s two largest regions
are the Dutch-speaking5 region of Flanders in the north, with 58% of the
population, and the French-speaking southern region of Wallonia, inhabited
by 32% of the population.6 The Brussels–Capital Region, home to
approximately 10% of the population, is officially bilingual.7 The area is
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1. KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
416 (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005).
2. NATO HANDBOOK 219 (2001).
3. Country
Profile:
Belgium,
BBC
News,
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/999709.stm.
4. Id. In one small area of Belgium, the East Canton region obtained from Germany after
World War I, German is the principal language of about 70,000 Belgians. Id.
5. The official language spoken in Flanders is now standard Dutch, not a separate Flemish
dialect, although several local dialects still exist. See KENNETH D. MCRAE, CONFLICT AND
COMPROMISE IN MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES: BELGIUM 56–59 (1986).
6. Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center, in FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL
CLEAVAGES 55, 56 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004).
7. Id.
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primarily French-speaking (85%8) and is located within the Flemish region
but near the Walloon region.
Early in the twentieth century, King Albert I was told by a Walloon
political leader, ―Sire, there are no Belgians anymore, only Flemings and
Walloons.‖9 The Belgian conflict between the Flemish North and the
Francophone South is a typical multi-issue conflict that combines issues of
history, culture, and identity, with strong economic dimensions. The conflict
has a long history: ―The heat of the discussions in the media, parliament and
public opinion led foreign observers to believe that the country was about to
fall apart.‖10 This quote fits the present situation very well, yet it was written
more than a century ago, before World War I.11
In this Article, we analyze the ongoing conflict in Belgium. Our focus is
on the actual role of the media and possible attitudes and contributions of the
media to this particular conflict. In Part II, we first analyze the different
factors contributing to the division in Belgium. We then explore the role of
the media in this conflict in Part III. In Part IV we examine the media’s use of
different styles and metaphors and their negative or positive impact on the
conflict. In particular, we look at surrealism, supposedly typical for Belgium,
and the use of humor. We also suggest a model to frame different approaches.
We conclude with some suggestions for a more positive role of the media,
applying our model for de-escalation of conflicts.
II. BELGIUM, A DIVIDED COUNTRY12
A. History
The conflict between the Flemish- and French-speaking communities
within Belgium has deep historical roots, going back to the seventeenthcentury liberation war of the so-called ―Low Countries‖ from the Spanish
rulers at that time. In the northern part of the territory that now makes up
Belgium, people spoke various Dutch-German dialects, except a small
French-speaking bourgeois elite. In the southern part of what is now
Belgium, French was the common language. As a result of the French

8. Kris Deschouwer, Kingdom of Belgium, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND
CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 48, 51 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr eds., 2005).
9. Id. at 50.
10. See Jeroen van der Kris, Belgium—A Praline Marriage, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE
WITHOUT A UNIFIED PUBLIC OPINION? THE SWISS EXPERIENCE AND THE BELGIAN CASE 50, 50
(Dave Sinardet & Marc Hooghe eds., 2009) [hereinafter IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE].
11. See id.
12. For a more detailed discussion of the cultural divide in Belgium, see Robert Mnookin &
Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No Reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in
Belgium, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (2009).
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Revolution, the whole country became a province of France.13 After the fall
of Napoleon in 1815, what is now Belgium became the southern part of the
United Kingdom of the Netherlands, ruled by King William I.14 Soon a
surprising coalition emerged, with deep resentment of Dutch rule. The liberal
bourgeoisie and Francophone aristocracy resented the use of the Dutch
language and ―foreign control.‖ The Catholic Church, especially influential in
Flanders, was suspicious of the Netherlands because it was seen as a
Protestant state.
In 1830, this coalition led a revolt against Dutch rule. In 1831, the
Belgian National Congress (dominated by the Francophone bourgeoisie,
consisting of Walloons and the Flemish elite) wrote a liberal constitution and
created a unitary parliamentary state with a constitutional monarch.15
Although the majority of the population has always been Flemish,16
Francophone Belgians have dominated the country politically, economically,
and culturally since the very beginning.
B. Language and Cultural Divide
In the new country, French was to be the exclusive and single language.17
Initially, the Dutch language was suppressed in all public administration and
in state-sponsored education. There was a systemic social and economic
discrimination against those who spoke Dutch. The Flemish majority were
treated as inferior peasants.18 Flemish who wanted to advance in society
learned French, and many Flemish bourgeois families spoke French at
home.19 Few Walloons ever bothered to learn Dutch.20 By the end of the
13. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 14.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Belgian Constitution was arguably the most liberal in Europe at the time. It
recognized fundamental freedoms relating to speech, press, religion, education, assembly, and
languages, and also included provisions relating to the separation of powers. See generally BELG.
CONST. arts. 8–41.
16. There were 2.4 million Dutch speakers and 1.8 million French speakers in 1846. André
Alen, Nationalism–Federalism–Democracy: The Example of Belgium, 5 EUR. REV. PUBL. L. 41, 45
n.24 (1993).
17. See Deschouwer, supra note 8, at 49. But see MCRAE, supra note 5, at 22. McRae
translates the article in the original constitution as follows: ―The use of the languages spoken in
Belgium is optional (facultatif). It can be regulated only by law, and only concerning official acts
and judicial matters.‖ However, the Law of 19 September 1831 declared French to be the only
official language for the proclamation of laws and resolutions. See ANDRÉ ALEN & KOEN MUYLLE,
COMPENDIUM VAN HET BELGISCH STAATSRECHT § 383 (2008).
18. See Luc Huyse, Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium, in CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE
IN BELGIUM: THE DYNAMICS OF A CULTURALLY DIVIDED SOCIETY 107, 109–10 (Arend Lijphart
ed., 1981).
19. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 39–40 (referring to a ―domestic colonialism‖ and stating that
―[t]his socioeconomic dimension of the linguistic boundary within the Flemish region has . . .
heightened linguistic tensions‖) (internal quotation marks omitted).

142

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:139

nineteenth century, a Flemish movement striving for language and culture
rights emerged and achieved some success with language laws.21 The 1898
―Law of Equality‖ recognized both languages in official documents,22 and a
1921 law contemplated that municipal officials might be bilingual.23
However, in practice the country remained largely Francophone.24
Turning points occurred in 1932 and 1935, when two monolingual regions
were created on the basis of a territorial line dividing the country into two
parts.25 The use of language in administrative matters, primary and secondary
education, and judicial matters was to be based exclusively on location—not
the mother tongue of the individual citizen. In Flanders, Dutch became the
only official language, and in the Walloon region, the official language was
exclusively French. Brussels and certain border areas were said to be
bilingual. With the exception of Brussels, the national language policy
essentially became one of dual monolinguism, based on the principle of
territorial location, not bilingualism, with language rights attaching to
individuals.26
Particularly, both World Wars have left deep scars in Belgian society.
Large battlefields serve to remind Belgians of the countless deaths in World
War I. The story goes that French-speaking officers refused to speak Flemish,
and for this reason many Flemish soldiers died. The IJzerbedevaart
(Pilgrimage of the Yser) is a yearly gathering of Flemish in honor of those
soldiers. The gathering also serves as a political meeting of individuals who
are striving for Flemish political autonomy. Even more delicate and at the
core of the conflict is the collaboration issue of World War II. Numerous
Flemish who culturally sympathized with the Nazis were sentenced to death,
while economic collaboration in the south remained largely unpunished.27

20. This asymmetry persists. See Victor Ginsburgh & Shlomo Weber, La dynamique des
Langues en Belgique [The Dynamics of Languages in Belgium], 42 REGARDS ECONOMIQUES 1, 4
(2006).
21. There is vast literature on the Flemish movement. See generally THE FLEMISH
MOVEMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: 1780–1990 (Theo Hermans, Louis Vos & Lode Wils eds.,
1992); François Nielsen, The Flemish Movement in Belgium After World War II: A Dynamic
Analysis, 45 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 76 (1980).
22. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 17, § 266.
23. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150.
24. See id.
25. Dave Sinardet, Territorialité et identités linguistiques en Belgique [Territoriality and
Linguistic Identities in Belgium], 51 HERMÈS 141, 144 (2008).
26. The language frontier became firm and final with the Language Act of 8 November 1962.
ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 17, § 271; MCRAE, supra note 5, at 152–56.
27. ANDRÉ DE VRIES, FLANDERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY 21–22 (2007).
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C. Economic Divide
From the outset, the Walloon region economically dominated the new
nation. With large coal reserves, this region was among the earliest in Europe
to industrialize, and it experienced rapid economic growth during the
nineteenth century.28 Flanders, on the other hand, relied on subsistence
agriculture. Crop failures led to a famine and contributed to massive
unemployment and severe economic hardship.29
For more than a century, the Walloons remained economically dominant,
but World War II brought a turning point. The coal and steel industries in
Wallonia started to decline. Over the years, many jobs were lost and there
was little foreign investment. In the meantime, Flanders enjoyed a period of
industrial modernization. The Flemish port of Antwerp prospered, and new
plants were built for thriving industries, such as car assembly and
shipbuilding. Flanders attracted substantial foreign investment.30 By the mid1960s, the Flemish gross regional product per capita surpassed that of
Wallonia.31 Today, the Flemish region of the country is substantially richer
than the Walloon region. The Flemish gross domestic product per capita
exceeds that of Germany and France, and nearly equals that of the United
Kingdom.32 The Walloon GDP, on the other hand, is similar to the poorest
regions in France and Italy.33
D. Social Divide
These differences have resulted in a social divide in a country that in fact
harbors two nations. A Belgian identity, if not entirely valueless,34 certainly
does not count for much. For many, their Belgian identity is thin, at least in
comparison to their local or regional identity.35 However, identity discussions
28. REFLECTION GROUP ―IN DE WARANDE,‖ MANIFESTO FOR AN AUTONOMOUS FLANDERS
WITHIN EUROPE 51 (English ed. 2006) [hereinafter MANIFESTO].
29. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 23–24.
30. MANIFESTO, supra note 28, at 51–53.
31. Hooghe, supra note 6, at 57.
32. Press Release, Eurostat, Regional GDP Per Inhabitant in the EU27 (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/09/23&format=PDF&aged=O&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en. In 2006, Flanders’s per capita GDP was 118% of the EU27
average, while the Walloon region’s was only 85%. Id.
33. Id.; Ludo Beheydt, The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium, in LANGUAGES IN
CONTACT AND CONFLICT: CONTRASTING EXPERIENCES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM 48,
53–54 (Sue Wright & Helen Kelly eds., 1995).
34. See Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, ―Will It Stay or Will It Go?‖ Federalism and
the Sustainability of Belgium, 29 W. EUR. POL. 877, 889 (2006) (―[T]he younger [Flemish] are more
willing to identify with Belgium, possibly because they lack first-hand experience with linguistic
discrimination.‖).
35. Hooghe, supra note 6, at 65. One research report indicates that less than half of the
Flemish feel simultaneously Flemish and Belgian; the other half feel more exclusively Belgian than
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are tricky. Identity is a complex and multilayered concept and includes
numerous distinct feelings.36 Like all social phenomena, it relates to multiple
factors that may vary historically, culturally, and sociologically.37
Undoubtedly, political and media discourse play important roles in the
creation of the identity construct.38
There are quite contrasting views on the degree to which Flanders and
Wallonia differ in their identity or share a common identity. One view is that
there are substantial cultural differences between the Flemish and the
Walloons. This view is represented by stereotypes such as that the Flemish
are disciplined and hard-working like the northern European Germanic
cultures, while the Walloons take after the more fun-loving Latins in southern
Europe.39 Ideological differences follow the linguistic lines: the socialist
tradition is stronger in the Walloon region, and the Flemish are much more
committed to a market economy.40 Flanders has a higher proportion of
observant Catholics than the more secular Walloon region.41 It has been
argued that these differences have been embedded in a historical perspective
since the origin of the country. Examples cited are the different electoral
behavior since the 1880s,42 the dissimilarity in public opinion regarding the

exclusively Flemish. Dave Sinardet, Politiek en pers in de Belgische communautaire maalstroom:
samenleven onder een lekkend dak, in MÉNAGE À TROIS: QUO VADIS BELGICA 237, 245 (Carl Devos
ed. 2006) [hereinafter Sinardet 2006]. Yet another research report indicates that the Flemish feel
very positive toward Wallonia and identify mostly with their Belgian nationality. Dave Sinardet,
Televisie zonder grenzen? De beeldbuis in Tijden van regionalisme en globalisering, SAMENLEVING
EN POLITIEK, Feb. 2001, at 35, 39. [hereinafter Sinardet 2001]. In the same paragraph, the author
refers to the latest European value research indicating that Flemish more easily identify with Flanders
than Walloons with Wallonia, but therefore do not feel less Belgian. Id.
36. See Marc Reynebeau, Political Institutions and the Construction of a Common Public
Sphere, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE, supra note 10, at 25, 26–27.
37. Marc Lits, Media in Belgium: Two Separate Public Opinions, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE,
supra note 10, at 43, 44.
38. Marc Hooghe & Dave Sinardet, Is There a Belgian Public Opinion?, in IS DEMOCRACY
VIABLE, supra note 10, at 5, 6; Dave Sinardet, De relatie tussen media, politiek en publiek in de
Belgische televisieberichtgeving over de andere gemeenschap 8–9 (Dec. 1, 2000) (University of
Antwerp Political and Social Sciences PSW Paper 2000/9) [hereinafter Sinardet, PSW Paper 2000/9],
available at http://webhost.ua.ac.be/psw/pswpapers/PSWpaper 2000-09 sinardet.pdf.
39. See RUDY AERNOUDT, VLAANDEREN–WALLONIË: JE T’AIME, MOI NON PLUS:
ANTIMANIFEST OVER DE VERHOUDING TUSSEN WALEN EN VLAMINGEN 17–35 (2006) (discussing
the various stereotypes and their effects on Belgian culture).
40. See Marleen Brans, Christian de Visscher & Diederik Vancoppenolle, Administrative
Reform in Belgium: Maintenance or Modernisation?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 979, 992–95 (2006)
(discussing the evidence on cultural differences between Flanders and Wallonia regarding
organizational reforms in government).
41. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 65–66.
42. Contra Marc Hooghe, Are There Really Two Public Opinions in Belgium?, in IS
DEMOCRACY VIABLE, supra note 10, at 30, 31 (arguing that public opinion cannot be deduced from
election results).
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cultural avant-garde of the 1920s, the dealings with second-wave feminism in
the 1970s, and the history of the Boy Scouts movement.43 These examples all
seem to reveal rather diverging patterns. In this view, the differences in
public opinion and identity are not a result of the institutional structure, but
vice versa. It is even asserted that politics in Belgium was one of the last
domains to be federalized.44 From that perspective the question is not so
much why Flemish and Walloons do not know each other any more, but rather
whether they have ever known each other.45
To the contrary, others claim that the often-invoked cultural differences
between Flanders and Wallonia are not that substantial.46 Some even feel that
Flemish and Walloons are closer to each other than the Flemish are to the
Dutch and the Walloons are to the French.47 It has been said that, ―The
Flemish and the Walloons have everything in common, except the language.
The Flemish and the Dutch have nothing in common, except the language.‖48
By and large, it is argued, Belgians are just like other average European
citizens.49 In this view, there is nothing inherently Flemish or Walloon in the
public opinion.
The existence of cultural differences, identity differences, or split public
opinions can be debated. What cannot be denied, however, is the segregation
between the north and the south. The Flemish and Francophone Belgians
know little about each other, do not read each other’s newspapers, do not
watch each other’s television, and do not listen to each other’s radio; they do
not have a common set of cultural references or topics of conversation.50 And
this probably has always been so,51 except for a small Flemish elite that spoke
French fluently.52
43. Marnix Beyen, The Duality of Public Opinions as a Democratic Asset: Confessions of an
Historian, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE, supra note 10, at 20, 20–22.
44. See infra Part II.E.
45. Beyen, supra note 43, at 22.
46. Dave Sinardet, Direct Democracy as a Tool to Shape a United Public Opinion in a
Multilingual Society? Some Reflections Based on the Belgian Case, in IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE,
supra note 10, at 34, 36. Very often there are merely different sensitivities related to the different
socio-economical contexts. That these differences in opinion may grow into community conflicts is
largely due to the split of the political landscape. See Sinardet 2006, supra note 35, at 237–47.
47. Reynebeau, supra note 36, at 28. The latter part of the reasoning is very doubtful. Many
agree that a greater cultural proximity exists between Brussels–Wallonia and France than between
Flanders and the Netherlands. For example, fewer than 5% of Flemish watch Dutch television
channels, whereas more than 30% of Francophone Belgians watch French television channels. Lits,
supra note 37, at 45.
48. van der Kris, supra note 10, at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Hooghe, supra note 42, at 31.
50. Reynebeau, supra note 36, at 28.
51. See Beyen, supra note 43, at 22.
52. Reynebeau, supra note 36, at 28.
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The high degree of residential and workplace segregation in the Flemish
and Walloon regions is stunning. Almost all commuting is to Brussels, but
not to the other regions.53 Within Brussels, there is a modest degree of
residential integration. The professional integration in the Brussels workplace
is much higher because numerous Flemish people who live in Flanders
commute to Brussels for work.54 Despite the country’s small size, social
interaction between the Flemish and Francophone people is extremely limited,
except in bilingual Brussels. This may very well be a direct result of the
language policies of dual monolinguism started in the 1930s.
Hence, millions of Belgians cannot talk to each other. At all levels of
education, up to the university level, the curriculum is typically taught
exclusively in either French or Dutch.55 A symbolic turning point in this
regard was the split in the magic year 1968 of the University of Leuven into a
Flemish and an independent Francophone university.56 Since the 1988
constitutional reform, nearly all decisions regarding educational competence
requirements have devolved to the communities.57
Ten years ago researchers found that in Wallonia, 17% of the population
knew Dutch in addition to French.58 Only 7% were trilingual.59 The
proportion of multilingual Flemish people was much higher: 57% knew
French and Dutch, and 40% knew English as well.60 It should be noted that in
Flemish secondary education, a course in French is obligatory, while a course
in Dutch is still not required for students in Wallonia, although most schools
53. The vast majority (about 90%) of all commuting is toward Brussels. Commuting between
Flanders and Wallonia is very limited (about 1%). MANIFESTO, supra note 28, at 63.
54. Id. at 63; MCRAE, supra note 5, at 76–77.
55. Except, however, for an increasing number of English courses at universities. English
might very well be the common language that could bring the divided Belgian people together. See
Alain Verbeke, Op-Ed., BHV? Let’s Do Business!, DE TIJD, May 21, 2008, at 16, and LE SOIR, May
27, 2008, at 16 (writing in both the leading economic newspaper in Flanders and the leading general
newspaper in Francophone Belgium).
56. The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) stayed in the ancient town of Leuven, where the
university was established in 1425. The Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) had to move out of
town into Wallonia where a new town was created, Louvain-la-Neuve. Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven, History of K.U. Leuven, http://www.kuleuven.be/about/history.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2009).
57. Limited exceptions are the determination of the start and end of mandatory education age,
minimum conditions for awarding diplomas, and the teachers’ pension regulation. See Alain
Verbeke, Unification of Laws in Federal Systems: Belgium, in UNIFICATION OF LAWS IN FEDERAL
SYSTEMS: GENERAL REPORT (Daniel Halberstam & Mathias W. Reimann eds., forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 7, on file with authors) (originally reported at the First Intermediate Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law on the impact of uniform law on national law, held
November 13–15, 2008, in Mexico City, Mexico).
58. Ginsburgh & Weber, supra note 20, at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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in Wallonia offer and promote Dutch classes. A general impression, however,
is that younger generations of Flemish speak French much less fluently now.
Although part of the reason for this is the increasing dominance of English,
we feel that the ever-growing segregation between Flemish and Walloons may
also be part of the explanation.
E. Political Divide
The divided character of Belgium—linguistically, culturally,
economically, and socially—seems to have been present from the very outset.
History shows an evolution during which the ambition of a central and unified
Francophone state has been gradually frustrated by the claims of a dominated
Flemish majority. It is argued that this ambition to be a modern nation-state
was ―imbued with contradictions‖61 from the very start. The extremely liberal
basis of the constitution inherently weakens the strong central power because
it implies that social identities have the freedom to develop into autonomous
forces that may eventually threaten the state itself.62
Because of this strong, unified state ideal, and the benefits it bestowed on
the Francophone establishment (including a Flemish elite that historically has
spoken French and allied itself with the Francophone establishment), it is
hardly surprising that the political institutions were the very last to federalize.
It was a long and steady process for the political structures to capitulate, with
the Flemish majority searching for its lingual, cultural, social, and economic
positions within the political construct. The process of political federalization
was started and accepted only out of pure necessity. This may explain why
the Belgian constitutional construct is so complicated and feels like
improvised and hurried patchwork.63 It was not a thought-out, consistent
reform, but a series of ad hoc compromises stitched together over more than
four decades and five reforms.64
Hence, the long-standing conflict between the Flemish and the
Francophones has been embedded into a complex federal structure that both
reflects and reinforces the organization of political, social, and cultural life on
the basis of language. It confirms the sense that there are ―two peoples‖ who
are likely, in time, to drift farther apart and not closer together. Ordinary
citizens may participate in the political process only among their own
language group.
Today Belgium is a federal country with substantial autonomy for the
French- and Dutch-language communities and the Walloon and Flemish
61.
62.
63.
64.

Beyen, supra note 43, at 23.
See supra Part II.A; Beyen, supra note 43, at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
See Hooghe, supra note 6, at 62–66.
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regions.65 The federal system is not hierarchical: the subunits have exclusive
legislative and administrative powers within their respective areas of
competence. The regions and communities are on equal footing with the
federal government, subject to the constitution. It is clear that such horizontal
federalism encourages autonomous policy making.66 Therefore, political life
in Belgium is mostly conducted along linguistic lines. For more than thirty
years, the three major political families—the Christian Democrats, the
Liberals, and the Socialists—have been split into separate French-speaking
and Flemish parties.67 Parties do not compete across the language lines for
community and regional elections, except in the Brussels–Capital Region.
Furthermore, even the federal (or national) elections are, in a sense, regional.
Indeed, people must vote in geographically defined areas with a choice
limited to parties of the language of that area. A citizen living in Flanders can
vote only for Dutch-speaking parties; and vice versa, someone in the Walloon
region must choose a French-speaking party.68 Politicians chosen for federal
responsibilities are accountable only to the electorate in their
community/region and not to the other half of the country.
At the national level, a variety of mechanisms ensure that neither the
Flemish nor the Francophone parties, acting on their own, can impose
decisions on the other language group. A governing majority in Parliament
requires a coalition government, which crosses language lines and typically
includes at least four of the six major parties.69 Each deputy in the national
House of Representatives is elected to a four-year term by proportional
representation from party lists in geographically defined districts. The
deputies are assigned to represent either the French group or the Dutch group,

65. These are technical constitutional concepts. Regions refer to territories: the Flemish,
Walloon, and Brussels Regions. Communities refer to personal matters related to language and
culture: the Flemish, Francophone, and German Communities. See Verbeke, supra note 55.
66. Jan Beyers & Peter Bursens, The European Rescue of the Federal State: How
Europeanisation Shapes the Belgian State, 29 W. EUR. POL. 1057, 1060 (2006).
67. As early as the 1930s, the Catholic Christian Democratic Party became divided into two
linguistic ―wings‖—one Flemish and one French-speaking—over the issue of Flemish cultural
autonomy. Later, in 1967, the Christian Democrats formally split into two separate parties as a result
of the conflict surrounding the Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain. Similarly, in the 1960s and
’70s, as Walloon economic conditions declined, Walloon nationalist parties sprouted up with
federalist–socialist agendas, which threatened the larger Socialist Party and led to its division in the
1970s. The national Liberal Party also broke up along Flemish and Francophone lines in 1968. See
Hooghe, supra note 6, at 59–61.
68. The Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde district is one notable exception that has led to enormous
turmoil. See Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 12, at 170–71.
69. See LIESBET HOOGHE, A LEAP IN THE DARK: NATIONALIST CONFLICT AND FEDERAL
REFORM IN BELGIUM 6 (1991). Because 60% of the population is Flemish, the unstated presumption
has been that the prime minister will be Flemish; not since the 1970s has a Walloon held the top
position.
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depending on the language of the electoral district.70 Constitutional
amendments and certain ―special laws‖ require concurrent majorities from
each language group, as well as a two-thirds overall majority.
Representatives also negotiate in the shadow of an ―alarm bell procedure,‖
which, although rarely invoked, carries with it the threat that the government
will fall. This procedure enables a two-thirds majority of either language
group to suspend the enactment of any proposed legislation expected to
adversely affect that language group. If invoked, the procedure requires that
the matter be referred to the government for further consideration and
negotiation. Unless an acceptable compromise is reached within thirty days,
the government falls and new elections must be held.
An important positive note, however, is that the Belgians have managed to
make this five-decade evolution with practically no bloodshed whatsoever.71
Whatever the future developments may be, history teaches that violence
remains very unlikely.72 Unfortunately, none of these state reforms have
brought stability to Belgium. Views on the long-term consequences of
federalism substantially differ. On one side is Arend Lijphart, who expects
federalism to bring about a new balance: besides a loyalty toward their subnational region, citizens will also develop a sense of federal loyalty. Opposed
to that is the more pessimistic view of Donald Horowitz, who predicts that
federalism merely functions as a transition phase and must lead to instability.
Regions awarded autonomy will use these powers and demand ever more
authority, in the end hollowing out the federal level.73
Since the June 2007 federal elections, the Flemish have called for various
systemic changes, including more community autonomy and a reduction in
the ―financial support‖ they give to the Walloons. For more than two years
the country has been in a deep institutional crisis. Months of negotiations in
the second half of 2007 led nowhere. In early 2008 an interim government
with the former Prime Minister was formed, and by Easter a new government
had taken over. As of this writing no progress whatsoever has been made
regarding institutional reforms. Although the financial and economic crises of
late 2008 have pushed state reform talks down the priority list of the political

70. Except for the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde district, which includes both the Brussels–Capital
Region and some surrounding suburbs, all of the electoral districts are monolingual.
71. See Hooghe, supra note 6, at 57–63.
72. The closest the country ever came to widespread violent strife was in 1951. The conflict
concerned the ―royal question‖—whether King Leopold III, who was thought to have collaborated
with the Nazis, should retain the throne. There was a general strike in which a few protesters were
killed. Because it appeared the country might be on the brink of civil war, a compromise was
engineered in which Leopold III abdicated in favor of his son. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at
111–12.
73. See Hooghe & Sinardet, supra note 38, at 5.
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agenda, they are issues that remain at the core of the Belgian political scene.
In the June 2009 regional elections, N-VA, a Flemish nationalist party
pleading for substantial Flemish autonomy, obtained a grand victory and
entered into the Flemish government.74 This undoubtedly will put the state
reform back on the table.
F. Summary
The structure of a conflict can be characterized as unstable when the
affected communities show little overlap.75 A conflict develops across the
fault lines between the two unrelated groups. According to Pruitt and Kim, a
community is likely to polarize under these conditions, producing escalation.76
This sort of polarization is exactly what is happening in Belgium, particularly
since 2007. The fault line is the ―language border,‖ separating groups with
strong historical and cultural differences. The regions differ, in terms of
landscape, industry, unemployment, and political traditions and
developments. The fault lines become stronger and are enlarged by the
complex structure, in which no national parties and no national media exist.77
This process of de-integration has picked up speed since the 1970s, reducing
crosscutting bonds.
III. MEDIA AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CONFLICT
A. Media Divide
There was a time when Francophone newspapers such as La Libre
Belgique and Le Soir sold numerous copies in Dutch-speaking Flanders.
There were even Francophone regional newspapers in Antwerp and at the
Flemish coast.78 The reverse was not true: Dutch newspapers were not sold in
French-speaking communities. The reason is obvious: Dutch was of no use to
the French speakers, and the Flemish elite had to speak French to be part of
the Belgian establishment. Indeed, the French-speaking Flemish elite happily
used this as a means to confirm their superiority to the common Flemish
people.
But all of this cross-consumption of media has disappeared. In 1960, the
unitary public media institute INR/NIR was split into two autonomous

74. Justin Stares, Flanders: Possibilities for a Divided Nation, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London),
June 28, 2009, at 26.
75. See DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE,
AND SETTLEMENT 27–36 (3d ed. 2004).
76. Id.
77. See Part III infra.
78. Lits, supra note 37, at 44.
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channels: the French-speaking RTBF and the Dutch-speaking BRT.79 At the
outset, RTBF broadcasted programs from France, while BRT broadcasted
local productions aimed at building and confirming a Flemish identity and
emancipation from the central Francophone power. The media split preceded
the political divide by a decade. It was only in 1970, with the first
constitutional reform, that powers regarding culture, information, press, and
audio-visual media were transferred away from the federal landscape to the
community level.80
Today Belgian media, as in almost all other areas in Belgian society,
reveal the phenomenon of the divide between north and south. No mass
media whatsoever—newspapers, television stations, or radio stations—aim at
both the French- and Dutch-speaking communities.81 Each community has its
own public broadcasting organization regulated by its language community,
not by the national government.82 Governance agreements for both public
channels call for the promotion of the cultural identity of their respective
language communities. There is no mention of the promotion of national
identity or cohesion, as in other federal countries.83 The daily newspapers are
exclusively Dutch, French, or German.84 The divide not only characterizes
public radio and television, but also commercial radio and television stations.
As mentioned earlier, Flemish do not read Francophone newspapers, do
not listen to Francophone radio stations, and do not watch Francophone
television. Similarly, French speakers do not read or watch Dutch-based
media. Within each group’s local media there is almost no reporting of events
of the other group, completing the segregation. Flanders and Wallonia are
unknown and foreign territories to each other.85 Only about 3% of the
Flemish television news is related to topics pertinent to the other language
community. By comparison, Francophone channels devote more attention to
Flanders and are also more federally oriented.86 Of the few Francophone
politicians appearing on Flemish television, 90% are federal officials (with
virtually no attention paid to the other region or community).87 On the
79. Dave Sinardet, Knut De Swert & Régis Dandoy, Franstalig, Vlaams, commercieel,
openbaar: zoek de verschillen: Een longitudinale vergelijking van de thema’s in de Belgische
televisiejournaals 6 (University of Antwerp Political and Social Sciences PSW Paper 2004/1)
[hereinafter Sinardet, PSW Paper 2004/1].
80. Lits, supra note 37, at 46.
81. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 237–249.
82. Belgian newspapers, however, are self-regulated by a single association, the Federation of
Editors. Country Profile: Belgium, supra note 3.
83. Sinardet, PSW Paper 2004/1, supra note 79, at 7.
84. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 250.
85. Lits, supra note 37, at 45.
86. Sinardet 2001, supra note 35, at 35.
87. Id. at 36.
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Francophone side, more time is awarded to elections, sports, and cultural
events in France than to such events in Flanders.88
B. Simplifications and Stereotypes
We mentioned that people of one community do not read or watch the
other’s media. We then saw that, within each community’s own media, there
is almost no reporting on the other side. In addition to all of this, when there
is news showcasing the other community, it is overly simplified by use of
stereotypes.89 The mechanisms used are similar on both sides.90 One aspect
or opinion is a symbol for the entire community. The focus is on one oftencaricatured feature of each community, while other features are ignored. The
Freudian narcissism of the small differences, with the focus on enlarging
every tiny difference to one of consequential size, is applied very skillfully.
The image-building is symmetrical, with each community perceiving itself as
the victim dominated by the other side. All of this is spiced up with
metaphors ranging from divorce to war.91
Thus, Flanders is often simplified in the Francophone media into one
single group of extreme right fascists who want independence from the
Francophones. An extreme opinion of one person of a separatist party is
regularly extended to the entire political class, and from there to the entire
community. Statements highlighting the cultural divide are frequently used
and amplified. Whatever is incongruent with this bias is often ignored. The
same is true in the Flemish media: the Francophones are portrayed as lazy,
socialist parasites full of scandals and corruption.
The rich
Brabant-Wallon (politically supporting the liberal Reformist Movement) and
the agrarian Luxembourg provinces (with a strong Christian Democrat
tradition) are regularly ignored. Here, too, sometimes the opinion of one
politician is extrapolated to the entire Francophone community.
The simplifications and stereotypes that follow from news biased by the
community divide may sometimes lead to misinformation.92 Obviously, for
professional media that apply high standards of objectivity and independence,
this is not acceptable. One example is when the Flemish Minister-President in
2006 said he did not need the King’s endorsement to make Flemish decrees.
88. Lits, supra note 37, at 46.
89. Dave Sinardet, Wederzijdse mediarepresentaties van de nationale ―andere‖: Vlamingen,
Franstaligen en het Belgische federale samenlevingsmodel (2007) (unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of Antwerp) (on file with author).
90. Dave Sinardet, Het samenleven van twee onderdrukte meerderheden: Vlamingen,
Franstaligen en de media, in WAAR BELGIË VOOR STAAT: EEN TOEKOMSTVISIE 27, 27–31 (Geert
Buelens, Jan Goossens & David Van Reybrouck eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sinardet 2007].
91. See Part IV infra.
92. Sinardet 2007, supra note 90, at 32.
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This is an accurate explanation of the constitution; however, a French
newspaper portrayed the statement as breaking news that the Flemish leader
had declared he did not need the King. Such a mischaracterization reinforces
the stereotype of Flemish separatism.
C. Bye Bye Belgium
On Wednesday, December 13, 2006, at 8:22 p.m., the French-speaking
Belgian channel RTBF interrupted its regular programs for a special news
report, reporting one item: ―The Flemish parliament has declared unilaterally
the independence of Flanders.‖93 A reporter standing in front of the Royal
Palace announced that King Albert II and his wife, Queen Paola, had left the
country for Kinshasa, Congo, in a military plane. Pictures from the Antwerp
Grand Place followed, where thousands of excited Flemish citizens were
celebrating. The President of the Walloon Parliament was filmed as the news
was brought to him: ―We still have Europe,‖ was his depressed comment.
Although after thirty minutes the RTBF did put a warning on the screen:
―Ceci est une fiction (This is fiction),‖ and the journalist on air repeated this
warning, the program left people in complete confusion. Surveys indicated
that 89% of the viewers believed what they had seen for quite a while, and 5%
continued to believe it despite the warnings.94 Only 5% never believed it at
all.95 Some foreign embassies sent worried messages back home. Thousands
of ordinary Belgians, 31,368 to be precise, made panicked phone calls.96 This
docu-fiction made the world news: European media outlets and U.S.-based
CNBC reported on it.97
It is not difficult to see where this docu-fiction comes from. The whole
documentary symbolizes a frame of mind, a Francophone phantasma,98 using
a rather surrealistic style.99 It is the culmination of decades of simplified and
stereotyped image-building of Flanders by the French-speaking
communities.100 The Flemish were vehemently opposed to this caricature of
Flanders. But, as we have discussed, Flemish media use exactly the same
strategies in their reporting about the Walloon and Francophone communities.

93. Lits, supra note 37, at 45.
94. Id. at 46.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Monique Juquois-Delpierre, Fictional Reality or Real Fiction: How Can One Decide?: The
Strengths and Weaknesses of Information Science Concepts and Methods in the Media World
5 J. INFOR. COMM. & ETHICS SOC’Y 235, 237 (2007).
98. Sinardet 2007, supra note 90, at 27.
99. See Part IV infra.
100. See generally LE VRAI-FAUX JOURNAL DE LA RTBF. LES RÉALITÉS DE L’INFORMATION,
(Marc Lits ed., 2007).
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This docu-fiction has made very explicit what is often implicit: that television
and other media confirm and reinforce identity values based on the focus of
oneself and intolerance for the other.101 These identity values in the two
Belgian communities both influence and are influenced by political and
cultural thoughts.
DVD Cover, Bye Bye Belgium (2007)

Bye Bye Belgium and the discussions that followed were released on DVD
by the Walloon public television station RTBF. The DVD cover depicts a
reproduction of the painting Pornocrates. The painting shows a naked and
blindfolded woman walking a pig. It was painted in 1896 by Félicien Rops, a
well-known Belgian artist.102 This painting fits well with the absurdism and
surrealist approach of the docu-fiction, and it symbolizes the cynical view of
politics often observed in Belgium.
Philippe Dutilleul, the maker of the documentary, worked on the project
for more than two years in total secrecy. Right after the documentary aired,
there was a live debate with five representatives of the Flemish community
and five from the Francophone community. Some but not all of the panel
members were politicians. The debate was disappointing. Rather than a
dialogue between people trying to listen to each other and develop some
empathy for each other’s perspective, it was merely a positional verbal fight
with each person defending his or her own view,103 never really listening to
101. Lits, supra note 37, at 46.
102. Félicien Rops Paintings, Art in the Picture.com: An Introduction to Art History,
http://www.artinthepicture.com/artists/Felicien_Rops/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2009).
103. See Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Bye Bye Belgium? A Shaky Union, INT’L HERALD
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the other side. In terms of negotiation theory, there was no active listening
whatsoever,104 with each panel member listening only to his own voice and
opinion. The day after the docu-fiction aired, on December 14, a book
appeared under the same title.105 The book documents many conversations
with leaders in politics, business, and academia. Many of these people were
informed of the plans to make a docu-fiction, solicited for their advice, and
asked to keep full confidentiality. All of them complied. Together with
Professor Robert Mnookin, who at the time was International Francqui Chair
at the University of Leuven, Verbeke met with Philippe Dutilleul and his
assistant.106 Mnookin appeared in the docu-fiction as the U.S. expert from
Harvard Law School and was interviewed in front of the U.S. Capitol in
Washington, D.C. Mnookin and Verbeke also wrote a chapter in the book,
analyzing the Belgian conflict through the apparatus of negotiation theory.107
Based on this first-hand involvement, Verbeke can confirm that in his
experience the intentions of Dutilleul were genuine. By interrupting the
regular primetime programming and showing a report that had some
credibility,108 he clearly aimed at shocking people. He wanted to break
through the Francophone audience’s comfort zone in order to create an
atmosphere of openness and dialogue. We think the filmmakers fully
expected the substantial impact of the docu-fiction. However, we believe that
they underestimated the amount of negative feedback generated by the film,
and the film’s contribution to escalation of stereotypes on both sides.
Intended to create awareness and dialogue, this incident fostered further fears
and negative sentiments between the Flemish and the Walloons. Barely six
months after the film aired, during the June 2007 federal elections, a stalemate
started that has kept the country hostage for more than two years.

TRIB. (Paris), Dec. 21, 2006, at 8.
104. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 62 (2000).
105. BYE-BYE BELGIUM (OPÉRATION BBB): L’ÉVENÉMENT TÉLÉVISUEL (Philippe Dutilleul
ed., 2006) [hereinafter BYE-BYE BELGIUM].
106. For the interview with Professor Mnookin, see id. at 304–08.
107. Robert H. Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, La théorie de la négociation. Utile pour la
Belgique, in BYE-BYE BELGIUM, supra note 105, at 589–616.
108. Professors Mnookin and Verbeke, both during the interview and later in written
comments, strongly suggested making the scenario more realistic. Because the documentary seemed
to be used as a serious mode, see Part IV infra, they felt it should not be a caricature. Although some
of these recommendations were followed, several elements remained exaggerated. In the view of the
makers, however, this was not so. This illustrates again the different views and perceptions in both
communities.
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D. Framing and Gatekeeping
News can never be neutral.109 Reality is always looked at through a
specific perspective.110 The same is true for journalists.111 They necessarily
frame news facts in a particular way. Research indicates that journalists
commonly use a dual-conflict scenario to frame facts, which necessarily leads
to simplifications.112 Journalists frame the news through the lens of a
reference scheme that is based on an often implicit consensus of the
dominating discourse of the moment,113 influenced by politics and other
social, cultural, and ideological organizations.
This dominant frame
determines how the media looks at reality and the terms of the debate.
Politics and media influence and reinforce each other in this dominant scheme
that does not necessarily correspond with public opinion at large.114 However,
public opinion is to some extent a construct of the political elites; maybe not
top down, but circular, mediated by the intervention of mass media.115
Indeed, as gatekeepers of information, and by constantly publishing
various survey results, the media determine in a substantial way what is
embraced by public opinion and what is excluded from it. As gatekeepers
they may not decide what people think, but they influence to a large extent
what people think about. They set the agenda in a constant interaction with
the political and public agendas.116 Even in a closed partitocracy system like
Belgium, research has found that mass media has important political agendasetting power.117 The effects in Belgium are greater on symbolic than on
substantive policy issues. Newspapers’ influence is larger than television’s,
and the effects are different according to the issue types.118
The media’s gatekeeping function not only involves the process of
109. Sinardet 2007, supra note 90, at 31.
110. Negotiation experts know this very well. Both in a negotiation or mediation, we aim at
bringing our story and the other side’s story to the table and hope that the parties realize that there is
no single truth, but several perceptions or stories of a complex reality. See DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE
PATTON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST
25–43 (2000).
111. See Richard Reuben, Constructive and Destructive Coverage of Conflict, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 45, 83 (2009).
112. Dave Sinardet, De communautaire koorts: symptomen, diagnose en aanzet tot remedie,
SAMENLEVING EN POLITIEK, Mar. 2003, at 14, 17.
113. Dave Sinardet, Politiek, media en tijden van crisis, SAMENLEVING EN POLITIEK, June
2006, at 1, 1.
114. Id.
115. Beyen, supra note 43, at 23.
116. Sinardet, PSW Paper 2000/9, supra note 38, at 6–7.
117. Stefaan Walgrave, Stuart Soroka & Michiel Nuytemans, The Mass Media’s Political
Agenda-Setting Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and Government in Belgium
(1993 to 2000), 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 814, 814 (2008).
118. Id. at 819, 831–32.
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selecting the news that passes through the gates of a news medium, but this
function also includes all aspects of transferring the message—the means,
frequency, priority, timing, and format of transfer. All of this is influenced by
different levels of gatekeeping, ranging from the individual journalist to the
type of organization and the communication routine of the organization.119
Public channels are supposed to be more normative, and commercial channels
more utilitarian. But in Belgium, with the liberation of the market at the end
of the 1980s and the reorganization of the public channels in the 1990s, the
distinction between public and commercial channels is fading away and has
been since the start of the new millennium.120 Only the Francophone public
channel RTBF remains somewhat faithful to the traditional typology.
E. Media Responsibility
Because of this impact, all mass media bear a responsibility toward
society. On the continuum of objectivity and independence, they must
critically assess their position and function. They owe a duty of full
information, including different perspectives and nuances, to the public and to
democracy in particular. Putting aside the popular media, who are driven by
economic ratios and tend to present only faits divers and stories focusing on
simple or popular topics, the responsibility falls almost entirely on the
shoulders of public media. Public media cannot escape the duty to deliver
hard news and should do so in a multi-perspective, non-radicalized, and noncaricaturized manner. Belgian media, embedded in the larger divide of
society and the political-institutional split, seem to have engaged on the
slippery slope of advocacy journalism. Be it Flemish or Francophone media,
they are biased by the political consensus of their community and primarily
use the lens of that particular perspective.
As mentioned, this leads to simplification, stereotypes, and even
misinformation. Numerous examples illustrate that the same facts are
reported diametrically differently in Flemish and Francophone media.
Conclusions made in Flemish media sometimes dramatically differ from those
made in Francophone media. It is stunning to unravel them and to identify the
interpretations and judgmental biases on both sides and data selected by each
side to support those conclusions.121 In the next section we will elaborate on
some examples.
119. Sinardet, PSW Paper 2000/9, supra note 38, at 4–5.
120. Sinardet, PSW Paper 2004/1, supra note 79, at 7–11, 30.
121. Julie Badisco, Berichtgeving over BHV. Een vergelijking van Nederlandstalige en
Franstalige nieuwsmedia (2008) (unpublished masters thesis, Erasmus University College Brussels)
(on file with author) (analyzing the differences between Flemish and Francophone media), available
at http://www.scriptieprijs.be/nl/index.php?page=44&jaar=2008&id=988 (click on ―Berichtgeving
over BHV.pdf‖).
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Moreover, the media reinforce segregation in Belgian society. Hence the
media landscape does not offer a true federal political forum. Political
debates on federal themes are held only among federal politicians in their
respective communities. There is no dialogue with the other communities;
there is only talk about them.122 This contributes to the democratic deficit.
Indeed, there is a federal level, with still very important powers, and yet there
is no true federal debate. Federal politicians remain unaccountable to one or
the other half of the population.123 Politicians cleverly use or abuse this
situation to their own benefit, holding a different conversation with the media
of the other side than with the media of their home audience, or even sending
representatives to the other community’s media to give a more moderate view
there than that espoused within the politicians’ home market.124
IV. HUMOROUS AND SERIOUS MODES:
A MODEL TO CLASSIFY MEDIA ACTIONS IN CONFLICT
A. Surrealism as a Key Element of Belgian Culture
In this Part we focus on a specific feature of the communication style used
in the media; that is, the mode in which the media act. The production of Bye
Bye Belgium represents to some extent a surrealistic approach to the Belgian
conflict. In its form and presentation, this docu-fiction plays with realities.
Surrealism can be seen as an essential part of Belgian culture. As Aubert,
Fraiture, and McGuinness write in their overview of Belgian modern art:
―[W]ho could imagine a Belgian culture without Symbolism and
Surrealism?‖125 Surrealism is a movement in art and literature that flourished
in the 1920s and ’30s. It is characterized by a fascination with the bizarre, the
incongruous, and the irrational.126 It was closely related to Dadaism. Both
Dadaism and surrealism are strongly anti-rationalist and much concerned with
creating effects that are disturbing or shocking. But whereas Dadaism is
essentially nihilist, surrealism is positive in spirit. Bye Bye Belgium has very
surrealistic features in its anti-rationalist approach and absurdist
characteristics. The image of Rops’s Pornocrates fits within this theme.

122. Sinardet 2007, supra note 90, at 33.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 34.
125. Nathalie Aubert, Pierre-Philippe Fraiture & Patrick McGuinness, Introduction: Distance,
Doubleness and Negation in the Belgian Avant-garde, in FROM ART NOUVEAU TO SURREALISM:
BELGIAN MODERNITY IN THE MAKING 2 (Nathalie Aubert, Pierre-Philippe Fraiture & Patrick
McGuinness eds., 2007) [hereinafter FROM ART NOUVEAU TO SURREALISM] (emphasis added).
126. See Bibiane Fréché, Surrealism in Belgium Between the Wars, in FROM ART NOUVEAU TO
SURREALISM, supra note 125, at 161–72 (detailing the advent of surrealism and its emergence in
Belgium).
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Though it was painted before surrealism emerged, it shares the same irrational
and bizarre features.
Surrealism can be defined as a humorous mode of communication, in
contrast with a serious mode.127 In a serious communication mode, the world
is approached from a rational and congruent perspective in which clarity and
objectivity are important.128 The assumption here is that we are ―living in a
coherent world, consistent across different people and situations.‖129
Sorensen explains:
This is the world based on reason and logic, and
contradictions are considered problematic, where something
cannot ―be‖ and ―not be‖ at the same time. Contradictions
are treated as failure to communicate properly, and assumed
to be based on misunderstandings. In this mode, they have to
be treated as problematic, otherwise they threaten to
undermine the perception that we share the same world.130
In a humorous mode incongruity, paradox, and ambiguity play central
roles.131 Contradictions are not problematic, but a necessary feature of the
humorous mode, where we play with duality, incongruity, and
misunderstandings. Humorous communication modes often present things
upside-down or in different frames simultaneously.132 In media, humorous
communication is presented in many different forms, varying from the classic
cartoons, to YouTube messages, to documentaries like Bye Bye Belgium.
Communicating in a humorous mode can serve different functions and can be
done in different ways, contributing to either conflict escalation or deescalation.
We first discuss different functions and ways of using humor. We then
apply both serious and humorous modes of communication to the media
portrayal of the Belgian conflict.
B. Different Functions of Humor
Humor serves different functions. These functions can be differentiated
between internal and external functions. Internal functions of humor serve the

127. See MICHAEL MULKAY, ON HUMOUR: ITS NATURE AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY
22–25 (1988).
128. See id. at 23.
129. Marino Bonaiuto, Elio Castellana & Antonio Pierro, Arguing and Laughing: The Use of
Humor to Negotiate in Group Discussions, 16 HUMOR 183, 185 (2003).
130. Majken Jul Sorensen, Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to
Oppression, 33 PEACE & CHANGE 167, 171 (2008).
131. Bonaiuto, Castellana & Pierro, supra note 129, at 185.
132. See id.
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person or group to enhance the self-image, cope with and reduce stress, and
promote well-being.133 The external functions serve to communicate with
other parties, outsiders, or bystanders, and can contribute to the development
of a conflict, either in escalating or de-escalating social situations.134
1. Internal Functions
There are more than 100 theories on the functions humor serves for the
individual or group.135 These theories have been summarized in three broad
categories: theories of superiority, relief, and incongruity.136
The theory of superiority is based on our fundamental need for social
comparison between self and others, and between our own group and other
groups.137 Through social comparison, one recognizes differences and sees
one’s self and one’s group as superior over another group. The other party is
strange and shows weaknesses that we do not have, or have overcome or
overgrown. This feeling of superiority is a fundamental need in groups. An
important element of the concepts of self and identity is defined by the groups
to which we belong. According to the social identity theory, we have a strong
need to belong to a group that outperforms other groups.138 The mere fact that
groups are defined as ―different‖ facilitates rivalry and conflict. Humor helps
to emphasize this feeling of superiority.
The second function humor can perform is to reduce stress and tension.
Theories of relief, drawing on psychophysiology, explain that humor helps
people to regain pleasure, as energy is needed to suppress anxiety, fear, or
anger.139 A simple remark or joke can result in loud laughter, reducing
tensions. In this way, humor is an important instrument used to cope with
stress in many domains, including intergroup and societal conflicts. As
conflict is usually a major stressor, both for groups and individuals, humor
helps to reduce the inner tensions.140
The third function of humor, embodied in incongruity theories, is to cope
133. Elizabeth E. Graham, Michael J. Papa & Gordon P. Brooks, Functions of Humor in
Conversation: Conceptualization and Measurement, 56 W. J. COMM. 161, 161–66 (1992).
134. Id. at 164–66.
135. Id. at 161.
136. SIMON CRITCHLEY, ON HUMOUR 2–3 (2002).
137. Id. at 2.
138. Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel eds.,
1979).
139. See CRITCHLEY, supra note 136, at 2–3.
140. Rod A. Martin & Herbert M. Lefcourt, Sense of Humor as a Moderator of the Relation
Between Stressors and Moods, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1313, 1313–24 (1983); John B.
Nezlek & Peter Derks, Use of Humor as a Coping Mechanism, Psychological Adjustment, and Social
Interaction, 14 HUMOR 395, 395 (2001).
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with conflict through cognitive work.141 Reframing situations, focusing on
incongruities, and highlighting the strange elements or absurdities in a
situation help to cognitively cope with complex situations. Drawing attention
to the incongruities offers people and groups the possibility to redefine their
reality, including conflicting realities, so as to better cope. Humor criticizes
assumptions about a situation, proposing an alternate reality, in an ambiguous
way.
2. External Functions: Four Styles of Use of Humor
Humor, and particularly humorous communication, serves not only
internal functions, but also social functions. The social functions of
humorous communication can be directed toward the other conflict party, as
well as to others involved, or they may influence outsiders. The intention of
the communication should be differentiated from the effect. All too often, the
use of humor, although intended to de-escalate and to bridge, results in
escalation. Humor researchers usually differentiate between four styles of
humor, based on the intention of the user: affiliative humor, self-enhancing
humor, aggressive humor, and mildly aggressive humor.142
Affiliative humor is used to promote social interaction, reduce
interpersonal or intergroup tensions, build a relationship by bridging, and seek
common experiences that can be seen as humorous for both parties.143 This
type of humor can have a constructive function, both in breaking the ice and
reducing tensions, as well as in agenda-setting. Drawing attention to a
conflicting issue in a humorous and playful way is often less threatening than
addressing the issue in a direct and ―serious‖ mode.144
Self-enhancing humor is typically used to cope with stressful situations.
In conflict, self-enhancing humor is used to empower one’s own group, as
well as to strengthen resilience in coping with the conflict.145 This type of
humor also can be used to strengthen both parties, if they are willing to work
through the conflict. It supports a positive attitude, by creating a good mood
among the parties, and the feeling of ―yes, we can.‖146
Aggressive humor is related to the previously mentioned interior theory of
superiority. Aggressive humor is used to make oneself feel better at the

141. See CRITCHLEY, supra note 136, at 2–3.
142. Eric J. Romero & Kevin W. Cruthirds, The Use of Humor in the Workplace, 5 ACAD. OF
MGMT. PERSP. 58, 59–60 (2006).
143. Id. at 59.
144. Bonaiuto, Castellana & Pierro, supra note 129, at 185.
145. Romero & Cruthirds, supra note 142, at 59–60.
146. See Viveka Adelswärd & Britt-Marie Öberg, The Function of Laughter and Joking in
Negotiation Activities, 11 HUMOR 411, 426–27 (1998).
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expense of the other party and to gain or maintain status.147 Also, aggressive
humor aims at manipulating others through threat or ridicule.148 Sarcasm and
cynicism are different forms in which aggressive humor can be expressed.
Mildly aggressive humor is a style in which parties are criticized through
humor, for example, through irony or teasing.149 This style can have positive
effects, particularly by appealing to and reinforcing shared norms. The humor
makes clear what is expected and who can deviate from the norms. This
might result in more agreement over what is acceptable. This can be true both
within the group, as well as for conflicting groups in society that share the
same values.150 Furthermore, this form of humor might challenge existing
ideas about reality and provoke parties to look at the conflict in more
ambiguous ways. This is a strong feature of Belgian media, who like to
ridicule the ―in‖ group. Boasting the self-image is rare in Belgium, therefore,
surrealism is used in comic strips, television shows, and radio programs to
deal with the dualities in society.
C. Humorous Communication in Conflicts Is Risky Business
Using humor in conflict communication is a double-edged sword. Humor
can facilitate interactions, create an enlightened atmosphere, and challenge
negative stereotypes of the other group, or a group’s own overly positive
images. The use of humor can also contribute to escalation, be it intentional
or not. People can easily feel provoked by the use of humor in conflicts,
particularly in intergroup conflicts. On the other hand, humor can be a
deliberate strategy to achieve social change in a nonviolent way.151 Media
often combine serious and humorous modes in dealing with conflicts, and
such contributions can have either an escalating or de-escalating effect. The
Danish Muhammed cartoons have demonstrated this.152 According to
Reuben, constructive coverage of conflicts by media can contribute to better
communication between parties, and more problem-solving behaviors, when it
provides reasons for hope, enhances trust, and leverages power between the
conflicting parties.153 Therefore, better communication can be realized

147. Romero & Cruthirds, supra note 142, at 60.
148. Leslie M. Janes & James M. Olsen, Jeer Pressure: The Behavioral Effects of Observing
Ridicule of Others, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 474, 484 (2000).
149. Romero & Cruthirds, supra note 142, at 60.
150. John C. Meyer, Humor in Member Narratives: Uniting and Dividing at Work, 61 W.J.
COMM. 188, 200 (1997).
151. Sorensen, supra note 130, at 184–86.
152. See Colloquy, The Muhammed Cartoons and Humor Research: A Collection of Essays, 21
HUMOR 1 (2008).
153. Reuben, supra note 111, at 78–79.
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through serious and humorous forms of coverage.154
D. Serious and Humorous Roles of the Media: The Belgian Case
The different roles media can adopt, both in serious and humorous modes,
are presented in Table 1. Theoretically, the concrete dealings of the media
with a conflict may be classified in one of these quadrants.
Table 1: Roles of Media Contributing to a Conflict
Serious Mode

Humorous Mode

Escalating

Representing one party

Ridiculing one party

De-escalating

Platform for dialogue

Adding new frames

The four different forms are illustrated in the Belgium conflict and the
roles media play in this conflict.
Escalating through a serious mode can be seen whenever the media report
in a biased way about the conflict, either by presenting the perspective of one
party more than the other, giving voice to only one side, or through the
media’s own comments. The way incidents are framed also can easily
contribute to escalation. In Part III we discussed many characteristics of the
Belgian media that contribute to this biased presentation. There is a lack of
interest in the media for ―the other party.‖ Very often, only acts or behaviors
that fit the negative stereotypes are presented. For example, every sign of
corruption or clientelism in Wallonia receives considerable attention in the
Flemish press. Besides this negative stereotyping, the media also emphasize
differences between the communities, thus contributing to the separate
identities that characterize a ―conflict group‖ identity.155 A group’s own
identity is strengthened through the contrast with the other community. The
media regularly report ―differences‖ between the Flemish and Walloon
communities, on all kinds of subjects that are often trivial. Headlines such as
―Walloons consult specialists more often than Flemish,‖ ―Less speed limit
controls on highways in Walloon provinces,‖ and ―More tax inspections in
Flanders‖ all focus on the differences, and contribute to negative

154. Lisa J. LaPlante & Kelly Phenicie, Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The Media’s Role
in Transitional Justice Processes, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 280–84 (2009).
155. PRUITT & KIM, supra note 75, at 31–32.

164

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:139

stereotyping.156 The media regularly report in terms of community division
(for example, ―the Flemish front‖ or ―the French-speaking riposte‖), reflecting
typical intergroup conflict perceptions.157 Furthermore, there is active
framing in terms of the existing conflict. A clear example is the framing of
soccer riots. These happen regularly among different teams in the Belgian
soccer league; however, they are framed by the Francophone RTBF in terms
of Flemish aggressors, against ―Walloon‖ supporters, thereby feeding the
feelings of fear amongst their audience.
Escalating through a humorous mode is the most classic form that media
use in conflict. Propaganda in intergroup conflicts typically uses humorous
forms to communicate negative images, ridiculing one party to promote the
feelings of superiority of one’s own group and feeding the fears of the other.
This is also widespread within the Belgian media.158 Two examples may
illustrate the perspectives. The first is a cartoon depicting a robber, walking
away from the reader. On top is the text: ―The French socialist party ran off
with a lot of votes.‖ A second picture is a good example of how Frenchspeaking media feed the fears of the Flemish community. One mother asks
the schoolteacher (in French) where her children are. ―They spoke French‖ is
the answer (in Dutch), as two punished kids are shown in the background.159
The Bye Bye Belgium case160 also can be qualified as escalating through a
humorous mode. The intentions were aimed at creating shock and
contributing to dialogue, but the effects clearly escalated the conflict. Though
unintended, this program fed anxiety on the French-speaking side and
irritations on the Dutch-speaking side. A constructive dialogue did not
emerge from this program.
One might question what precise form was used here: humorous, serious,
or both? As we already pointed out, in our view the maker of the docu-fiction
identified rather strongly with the fears of the French-speaking community.
Therefore, what may appear as a program in a ―humorous‖ and absurdist
mode is in fact based on serious feelings and thoughts. The Francophone
audience, too, building on many years of stereotypes, largely perceived the
docu-fiction to be a serious mode. There may have been a mismatch in the
subjective perspective of a serious mode mixed with the objective frame of a
more humorous mode. This incongruity might explain, to some extent, why
the film’s effects did not contribute to mutual respect and understanding but
instead escalated the conflict.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

van der Kris, supra note 10, at 50.
Lits, supra note 37, at 45.
Sinardet 2007, supra note 90, at 27.
Pierre Kroll, LE SOIR (Brussels, Belg.), Sept. 1, 2006 (on file with author).
See Part III supra.
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Analyzing Bye Bye Belgium from the perspective of functions and styles
of humor, we see that this form might meet a superiority need. Not in a sense
of the most powerful, but rather expressing the feeling of a group that feels
morally right. The Flemish are pictured as a disloyal group that shows no
respect for the federal constitution, whereas the Walloons are the evident
victims in the scenario. This was perceived by the Flemish as a ―bad joke,‖
an aggressive and insulting form of humor.
Another internal function of humor is, as mentioned, stress relief. In this
case, the intention was apparently not to reduce stress, but to increase it,
though the level of added stress might have been underestimated. The stress
level could have been positively influenced by the film’s emphasis on its
absurdist features, and by the inclusion of more affiliative and self-enhancing
humor, empowering both groups. Bye Bye Belgium could have contributed to
the realization of ambivalent and dualistic reality through playing with
incongruities. But, by excessively playing on fears, and taking the scenario
too seriously, we feel that the film has somewhat missed this potential.
Though it might appear that the King and Queen fleeing the country into
Africa is absurd enough, many people actually believed the story. Here, the
filmmakers could have better utilized the cornerstones of surrealism, as we
will discuss in our final paragraphs.
The Belgian media have undertaken several attempts to contribute to deescalating through a serious mode. Acknowledging that the majority of the
Belgian population speaks Dutch, in March 2009 the Walloon parliament
unanimously agreed to replace voice-over dubbing with subtitling when
Dutch-speaking people are interviewed for French-speaking state television.161
This decision represents a symbolic gesture, and it also helps signal to the
French-speaking community the importance of the Dutch language within
Belgium.
The daily newspapers Le Soir and De Standaard tried several common
operations, aimed at achieving a better understanding of each other and
contributing to a shared Belgian identity. The newspapers sent journalists for
one month to survey each other’s area, reporting on their observations.162
Going one step further, the newspapers exchanged journalists to work
temporarily with each other’s media. The two newspapers also organized
several common public debates in both languages, aiming to bridge the points
161. Franstaligen vragen ondertiteling op RTBF, HET NIEUWSBLAD (Groot-Bijgaarden, Belg.),
June 5, 2008, http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=dmf05062008_066.
162. The journalist exchange was reported on the web site of each publication. See Bernard
Demonty & Olivier Mouton, Destins croisés du Soir et du Standaard, LE SOIR (Brussels, Belg.),
Mar. 17, 2007, http://www.lesoir.be/dossiers/Face_a_face/enquete/notre-route-commune-est-un2007-03-17-517373.shtml; Bernard Demonty & Olivier Mouton, De Confrontatie Noord-Zuid, DE
STANDAARD (Groot-Bijgaarden, Belg.), Apr. 17–21, 2007, http://standaard.typepad.com/noordzuid/.
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of view considered to be so distant. These efforts represent attempts by the
media to play their part as citizens, inflect the separatist speeches, and cause a
shared national conscience to emerge.
These attempts were embedded in a national strategy to strengthen a
national identity. At the start of 2007, the editors in chief of the two
newspapers had a meeting with King Albert II. The intentions were clearly
aimed at bridging and building more understanding and dialogue.
However, it appeared difficult to conduct these ―cross-border‖ activities
without reinforcing feelings of irreconcilable differences. For example,
journalists working in each other’s region sometimes used a tone as if they
were sent to remote and dangerous regions.163 Also, the presentation of joint
activities differed considerably. For example, both newspapers had a double
interview with Flemish singer An Pierlé and French-speaking rapper Baloji.
Analyzing the presentation of the interviews in both newspapers shows
remarkable differences. Baloji is asked if he thinks there are fewer contacts
nowadays between Walloon and Flemish Belgians. In Le Soir his answer is
―yes,‖ whereas in De Standaard his answer is ―no.‖164
Using a humorous mode to de-escalate conflict in the media can be done
in different ways.
For example, humor can contribute to a better
understanding of cultural differences. The exchange of journalists and
cooperation between newspapers is an easy basis for humorous reflections on
differences between the communities, and for mirroring. In January 2009, a
Walloon reporter, Christophe Deborsu, received training in cross-country
cycling. Though it is one of the most popular sports in Flanders, it is almost
unknown in Wallonia. Deborsu presented his training in a humoristic way,
while challenging the self-image of the Walloon.165
The recent Belga-vox initiative aims to contribute to a shared national
identity, with media playing an important role. On May 17, 2009, the Belgavox concert was held in Brussels: a free concert with many
well-known local and international artists. The concert was the start of a
program that aims to promote solidarity, dialogue, respect, cohesiveness, and
multicultural diversity in Belgium. Among the organizers are also several
national media organizations. This form can be classified as serious, given
the clear rationality of the initiative. The potential exists for these initiatives
to take different creative forms, fitting a more humorous mode.
163. Lits, supra note 37, at 47.
164. Mark Grammens, De Standaard, Le Soir, en het wederzijdse begrip, LVB.net, May 2,
2007, http://lvb.net/item/4590.
165. Cathérine De Kock, ―Ik begrijp niet dat er nog geen doden zijn gevallen‖:
Waal
Christophe
Deborsu
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van
oer-Vlaams
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Jan.
28,
2009,
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E. Metaphors in the Media of the Belgian Conflict
In communication about conflicts, metaphors are often used by media to
simplify realities, construct meaning, and influence emotions.
Our
classification model can also help in ordering metaphors that are used to
describe the conflict, initiatives within the conflict, and the probable
outcomes. The metaphors can communicate either a serious or humorous
mode, and either an escalating or de-escalating view on the conflict.
Analyzing the different metaphors offers another approach to understanding
whether
the
media
cover
a
conflict
in
escalating
or
de-escalating terms, and whether they contribute in a constructive or
destructive way.
Metaphors have been used in the most destructive ways, describing parties
as non-human ―cockroaches‖ or evil. However, metaphors can also
communicate hope: ―we see light on the horizon‖ or ―at the end of the
tunnel.‖ Current use of metaphors in the Belgian media, whether more
serious or humorous, generally seems to escalate the conflict.166 The
metaphors clearly represent a rather pessimistic, cynical, or surrealistic
approach to the conflict (Table 2).
Table 2: Metaphors in the Media
Serious Mode

Escalating

De-escalating

Divorce
War, time bomb
Reanimating a dead patient
The orchestra playing on the
Titanic (federal
government)
???

Humorous Mode
A praline divorce
Varied menu, no fat fish or
big steak
Bad slapstick comedy
Kafka
Jack Bauer in 24
???

Metaphors that are often used in the media to represent the current
developments in Belgium at the federal level are divorce, war, and a time
bomb. Also, clearly pessimistic images include ―the government tries to
reanimate a dead patient‖ and ―the government acts like the orchestra on the
Titanic; it plays on while the ship sinks.‖ More humorous metaphors refer to
a bad slapstick comedy and restaurants where no clear menu is served.

166. This is based on personal observations of Belgian media by the authors over the past
years. These observations are merely anecdotal and are not based on a scientifically sound
methodology.

168

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:139

Constructive coverage of conflicts,167 including metaphors, is possible
when hope is fostered, power differences are reduced, and trust is enhanced.
We have not found metaphors in the Belgian media that contribute to these
elements. We could not find metaphors expressing de-escalating tendencies,
or an optimistic image of Belgium as an integrated nation with a clear
identity. On the contrary, the metaphors reflect a rather pessimistic view on
the future. The most optimistic view is probably that the situation is hopeless,
but not too serious. Typical responses given by Flemish people when
interviewed by international media on the constitutional crisis are that they do
not have time to answer the question because they have to eat their French
fries, or that they do not care about the crisis, as there is always some
government left, if another one is in crisis.168
V. TOWARD DE-ESCALATION
Belgian media are an inherent part of the country’s basic divide between
North and South and also contribute to this divide. We have concluded that
the media have on many occasions become players in the game and have
crossed the tricky lines of advocacy journalism. Most of the communication
contributes to conflict escalation. Both in serious and humorous modes,
stereotypes are reinforced. The metaphors that are used express pessimism
and feed the conflict. Hence, some press coverage of the Belgian conflict has
been destructive, to use the framework of Richard Reuben.
Nevertheless, there have been several constructive initiatives taken by
media on both sides to create empathy and mutual respect.169 They have done
this either through a serious mode (promoting knowledge of each other,
organizing and facilitating debates and dialogues, or promoting a shared
identity), through humorous modes (challenging stereotypes or producing a
docu-fiction), or a combination of both (such as concerts and cultural events).
Their impact has, however, remained very limited. It is clear that genuine deescalating intentions by no means guarantee social change in the direction that
the media, producers, and journalists seek.
We believe that our classification model is not only a useful means by
which to examine media action—offering a quadrant model through which
different media actions can be broadly viewed and systematically analyzed—
it also may be a preparatory tool in exploring how to act, communicate, and
cover conflict in the future.
The media in general and individual journalists should first question
167. Reuben, supra note 111, at 78–79.
168. This is based on the authors’ personal observations of television newscasts on
Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS), a leading Dutch public broadcaster.
169. See Part IV supra.
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themselves and critically reflect on their position in society at large and in a
conflict in particular. Our quadrant model may be helpful in structuring such
reflection. When preparing an article, interview, radio or television news
item, or documentary, the journalist can review his draft through the lens of
our model. If the upper left or right quadrant colors heavily, he should step
back and rethink the article, because he might be engaging in an escalating
mode. A clear challenge for the media, in the Belgian case and perhaps for
many other cases as well, is to try to minimize these escalating
communications.
The Belgian case illustrates the complexities and
difficulties in achieving this, given that media have their own audience,
usually limited to only one of the conflicting parties. We accept that media
can never play a truly neutral role. But we plead for a more conscious and
self-reflective attitude, with which the media transparently acknowledge their
own positions, reference schemes, and perspectives, and use that information
to try to create constructive and de-escalating coverage of conflict.
This path is never easy. This, too, is taught by the Belgian case. Even
with the best intentions, journalists are caught in their old frames, thus
reinforcing stereotypes.
But the situation is not black or white. We have seen brave attempts, both
in a serious and a humorous mode, to walk on the path of constructive and deescalating conflict coverage. The attempts have been made through
cooperation between media, including journalist exchanges, ―human interest‖
stories, joint productions between representatives of both conflicting groups,
and promotion of boundary-crossing role models, such as artists, pop stars,
and athletes.
To us, it seems very much worthwhile to further explore these
constructive initiatives. We should support media that are willing to set up
these experiments with expertise, skill, and, perhaps, coaching. As conflict
scholars are very well aware, considering perspectives from two or more sides
in a conflict is challenging and almost impossible when one is personally
involved. Cooperation with conflict scholars and practitioners indeed might
be helpful, both in the design of constructive initiatives and in developing
attitudes and competencies, as well as in providing concrete support and
advice on the job.170
Whether one is working through a serious or a humorous mode, the
essence is to focus on de-escalation. At the core of de-escalation is the
creation of hope and enhancement of trust, mutual understanding, and respect.
This is the best argument against radicalization and reasoning on the basis of
170. This fits well with Susan Hackley’s suggestions to promote cooperation between conflict
scholars and journalists. Susan G. Hackley, In the Global Village, Can War Survive?, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 25, 40–43 (2009).
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exclusiveness. If one comes to understand that the world has many faces, that
all stories have value, and that the situation or conflict is never
unidimensional but carries in itself an inherent doubleness or multiplicity,
then de-escalation would follow naturally. Coping with this doubleness,
managing it as a permanent tension of life that cannot and should not
disappear, is a skill we believe that Belgium should be familiar with.
Indeed, a typical characteristic of Belgian culture and art might bring hope
for the Belgian conflict. In Belgian art, a quest for self-determination is
expressed, seeking ―a resolution of its own doubleness that does not entail the
erasure of that doubleness.‖171 This quest is not accompanied by uncertainty
or agonizing discomfort; in fact, the opposite is true.172 In Belgian art,
particularly surrealistic forms, the artists use the complexities and paradoxes
to create new and hybrid forms. Such an approach might inspire the media to
cover the community conflicts creatively and in de-escalating ways.
We therefore hope and plead for more humor in media coverage of
conflicts. Dealing with conflict in a humorous mode can contribute to social
changes in a nonviolent way, as has been demonstrated in several
situations.173 Our wish for the Belgian media is that they may explore
intensively and self-critically the use of a humorous and de-escalating mode
to approach the Belgian conflict, and that they may contribute to the creation
of many options and possibilities for a more positive climate and transcend
long-defined fault lines. A humorous mode in approaching conflict may help
the Belgian media consider new perspectives and create new frames for
looking at enduring tangible relations.

171. Aubert, Fraiture & McGuinness, supra note 125, at 2.
172. Id.
173. Sorensen, supra note 130, at 184–86.

